The impact of socio-political and economic environments on private sector participation in energy infrastructure delivery in Ghana by Owusu-Manu, D. et al.
1	
	
The Impact of Socio-Political and Economic Environments on Private Sector Participation 




Purpose: Investment in power and electricity generation to replace aging infrastructure with new 
represents a major challenge for developing countries. This paper therefore seeks to examine 
infrastructure projects’ characteristics and how socio-political and economic investment 
environments interplay to influence the degree of private sector participation (PPP) in 
infrastructure delivery in Ghana.  
Design: Using World Bank Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) and Private 
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database data from 1994 to 2013, binary logistic 
regression was used to: i) determine the probability of a higher or lower degree of private sector 
participation; and ii) examine the significance of factors that are determinants of private 
investments.  
Findings: The findings reveal that the private sector is more likely to invest in a higher degree of 
PPP infrastructure projects through greenfield and concession vehicles as opposed to management 
and leasing contracts. From the extant literature, drivers of private sector participation included 
infrastructure project characteristics and the socio-economic-political health of the host country. 
However, the significance, direction and magnitude of these drivers vary.  
Originality: This paper identifies investment drivers to PPP advisors and project managers and 
seeks to engender discussion amongst government policy makers responsible for promoting and 
managing PPP projects. Direction for future work seeks to explore competitive routes to 
infrastructure debt and equity finance options that finance energy projects.  
 




Global demand for electricity is almost double that of the total energy consumption, and this 
challenging situation is exacerbated by the investment needed to replace ageing power sector 
infrastructure (EC, 2011). In developing countries, an estimated $5 trillion of investment is needed 
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to meet the expected demand for electricity by 2030, with more than $2 trillion needed for new 
generation capacity alone (Woodhouse, 2005; Tohmatsu, 2003). This investment shortfall has 
created a deficit in energy and consequently, lethargic economic growth across the African 
continent (UNECA, 2011). Traditionally, public funds (mainly taxes and rates) and donor support 
have provided major sources of finance for infrastructure development in middle-income and low-
income developing countries (Owusu-Manu et al., 2008; PSIRU, 2012). However, such funds are 
inadequate and have failed to resolve the energy infrastructure deficit because this complex 
problem encapsulates both structural and political attributes. The extant literature reports that 
structural attributes include inappropriate policy framework regulations (including tariff setting 
and procurement), while political attributes include inefficient public institutions for the 
management of infrastructure, limited political will to prioritize energy development, and 
prevailing political instability (UNECA, 2011; OECD, 2012).  
 
The electricity market’s weak financial condition stems from under-pricing of electricity tariffs 
and inefficiencies in revenue collection, which in combination have made power projects 
unattractive to private investors (World Bank, 2011). In Ghana, the underdeveloped and shallow 
nature of the capital market affords limited alternatives for investors to obtain long-term 
‘affordable’ finance for infrastructure projects (Irving and Manroth, 2009; UNECA, 2011). 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) have hitherto sought international investment even though 
accompanying foreign exchange rates represent a significant risk. These systemic issues have 
reduced private participation in energy infrastructure development and have accounted for high 
electricity tariffs. The conundrum for many developing countries is how to create a safe investment 
environment that generates affordable electricity (ibid).  
 
Innovative financing approaches represent a possible solution for both current and future 
infrastructure needs (Badu et al, 2012). Public Private Partnership(s) (PPP(s)) represents one such 
approach and provide: alternative sources of capital; a vehicle for improving the efficiencies in 
public project investment delivery; and an opportunity to enhance project management expertise 
(Moszoro and Krzyzanowska, 2007). By combining public needs with private capability and 
resources, PPPs represent a more politically palatable option than privatization (UNECA, 2011). 
To date, empirical research has focused on the risk factors (i.e. political, legal and economic) at a 
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national level as individual determinants of PPPs (c.f. Basılio, 2010; Albalate et al., 2012; 
Hammami et al., 2006; Ismail, 2013) and the critical success factors for the implementation of 
PPPs in infrastructure projects (c.f. Ogunsanmi, 2014; Zagozdzon, 2013). Limited research has 
been undertaken to explore how characteristics of infrastructure projects and the socio-political 
and economic investment environments interact at a holistic level to influence the degree of private 
sector participation. This research therefore seeks to investigate these interrelationships within 
Ghana’s energy infrastructure market as a means of generating greater understanding of them. 
Emergent new knowledge generated will afford crucial information for PPP advisors, project 
managers and government officials who strive to reform energy markets and concomitant 
infrastructure development.  
 
LEGAL FORMS AND DEGREE OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY  
PPPs have provided a catalyst for stimulating greater private sector participation in the provision 
of public services (Demirag et al., 2010). PPPs legally bind public and private sector entities and 
this arrangement facilitates a conduit, or point of entry, for private investors to participate in 
infrastructure delivery (Peirson and McBride, 1996 in Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). Contractual 
arrangements for PPPs are classified into five thematic groupings, namely: i) management 
contracts; ii) leasing contracts; iii) concessions; iv) greenfield projects; and v) divestiture/ 
privatization. Each variant contains sub-types according to the level of private sector participation 
and the degree of risk associated with the contract (UNECA, 2011).  
 
Under management contracts, the private company assumes responsibility for the operations and 
maintenance of the public enterprise for an agreed contract fee and over a specific period (normally 
3-5 years) (c.f: ESCAP, 2011). Ownership, investment decisions, and financial responsibilities 
remain with the public sector (Pessoa, 2008). The Built-Lease and Operate (BLO) organization 
provides an example of a typical management contract used in the utilities sector (i.e. electricity, 
gas, water, transport and telecommunications) (Devapriya, 2006). For leasing contracts, a private 
company acquires temporary ownership of the asset over a specific period in return for revenues. 
Responsibility for operating the asset is assumed, including any associated commercial risks, 
typically over a period of 10-15 years (Ogunsanmi, 2014). Under concession, a public entity owns 
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the assets but operations, maintenance and investment decisions are contracted out to a private 
company; ownership of the asset reverts back to the public sector after a specific 25-30 years 
period of time (IBRD/World, 2009). This contractual arrangement may release efficiency gains in 
both operations and investment but requires considerable commitment and regulatory capacity for 
its sustainability (Pessoa, 2008). Under the greenfield arrangement, the private investor finances, 
builds and operates a new project for a specific period and this remains in private ownership 
(Albalate et al., 2011). The private investor absorbs the commercial risk while the political and 
exchange rate risks are shared with the public sector (Pessoa, 2008). Such projects are myriad but 
the most common is Built, Own and Transfer (BOT) where asset ownership is transferred to the 
government at the end of the concession period (ibid). Because of the high initial investment and 
lengthy concession periods involved (15-30 years), an appropriate risk distribution strategy 
between parties is required. Other forms of greenfield projects include: Build-Own-Operate 
(BOO); Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), Design-Build-Operate (DBO), Design- Build- 
Finance-Operate (DBFO) and Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT). Divestiture, otherwise known as 
privatization, is where a public enterprise (or part(s) thereof) is sold to a private entity in exchange 
for an equity stake (Devapriya, 2006). The private investor acquires ownership of the public assets 
and assumes all related risks (Albalate et al., 2011). This contractual arrangement provides 
potential high efficiency gains but requires a solid regulatory environment and careful preparation 
to be successful (Pessoa, 2008). Divestiture can be partial divestiture or joint venture, where part 
of an asset is sold to the private sector or the government and a private entity jointly fund a new 
asset (UNECA, 2011; Devapriya, 2006). The duration of this contract is usually indefinite but it 
may be limited under license (Pessoa, 2008).  
 
From this synthesis of literature, it is appropriate to hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The degree of private sector participation in an energy infrastructure project delivery 
is significantly dependent on: (H1a) ownership level; (H1b) size of investment; (H1c) the power 
sector; (H1d) generation segment; and (H1e) revenue source. 
 
The type of PPP arrangement entered into determines the degree of private sector participation; 
the extent of investments; sharing of risk; and other requirements needed to execute the project 
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successfully. The degree of participation is theoretically classified (for the purposes of this 
research) as either ‘higher’ or ‘lower’. The higher the risk that the private investor assumes, the 
higher the intensity of participation and the greater the anticipated profitability from such risk 
taking (refer to Figure 1). Concessions, greenfield projects and divestiture are classified as higher 
intensity forms of PPP contracts, while management and leasing contracts are regarded as lower 
intensity forms of PPP contracts.  
 
PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENTS AND THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENTS  
Attracting private sector investors to PPP contracts and their successful implementation requires 
both a supportive policy/ regulatory framework and a competitive investment climate (Alexander 
et al., 1996; and Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2004). Robust economic regulations ensure that the 
interests of all parties involved (public, private and the end user) are protected (World Bank, 1994). 
Unbundling the once monopolized state utilities, and establishing independent regulatory regimes 
to oversee them, brought about effective competition and efficiency within electricity markets 
(Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983; Newbury, 2000; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). Competition is a 
prerequisite for markets to work efficiently because it lowers costs and improves product and 
service quality (Austvik, 2009). An environment of macroeconomic and political stability, policy 
credibility and the existence of a sound regulatory framework are necessary for lowering the 
perceived risk of expropriation (c.f: Kerf et al., 1998). However, within developing countries, 
social regulatory policies that are geared to support election campaigns are often unpalatable to 
private investors. To protect investors, regulations can be implemented to protect the rate of return 
on investments (World Bank, 1994; Burns and Riechmann, 2004). Yet, despite the palpable 
benefits of PPPs, efforts to deregulate are often met with skepticism, derision and strong resistance 
(Balouga, 2012).  
 
Establishing central agencies that have the financial and technical capacity to oversee the 
management of PPP projects is a prerequisite to the successful implementation of PPP contracts 
(Pistor, 2000). Such institutions facilitate transparency in management accounting and financial 
reporting - essential for performance measurement during the implementation and evaluation of 
PPP contracts (Demirag et al., 2010). The effectiveness of regulatory institutions depends upon 
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the structure and process of regulation, key aspects of which are: the independence and competence 
of regulatory agencies; the transparency and openness of the regulatory process; the existence of 
formal oversight and timely judicial review; and the country’s stability and reputation for 
respecting private property rights (Smith, 1997; Pargal, 2003; Noll, 2000). Effective regulations 
and institutions provide confidence and assurance for the protection of private sector investment 
and reduce the risk faced by the host country (Parker and Hartley, 2003). 
  
A country’s economic stability (or ‘pull factor’) represents a specific portfolio of investment risks 
and returns which may, or may not, attract foreign investment (Mody et al., 2001; Ahmed and 
Zlate, 2013; Dua and Garg, 2013; c.f. Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Kinda, 2007). Countries with larger 
economic size, lower inflation, low external debt and more developed financial markets minimize 
the economic and financial risks accordingly (Basılio, 2010). From the extant literature the 
following economic and financial variables are reported as ‘triggers’ of capital flows: real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and economic growth; the rate of inflation and international 
reserves; external debt and general government balance; fuel exports; and population (Eichengreen 
and Mody, 2000; Rose-Ackerman and Tobin, 2005; Basılio, 2010; Albalate et al., 2012).  
 
Economies that have deregulated utility industries have witnessed an upward surge of private 
sector participation in infrastructure investments. Despite these reforms, the availability of a credit 
market in the host country represents an additional key factor to attracting private sector investors 
(Zagozdzon, 2013). Accessing capital via the credit market lowers investors’ financial constraints 
and financing costs (c.f. Tobin and Brainard, 1963; Boyd and Prescott, 1986) and provides 
corporate governance by dealing with agency costs and informational asymmetries (c.f. Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1989). In turn, the market facilitates a pooling and sharing of risks posed. A weak 
credit market in developing countries poses a significant issue (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2009). 
The size and depth of the local capital market (equity and debt) is much smaller, less liquid and 
has a narrower investor base. For this reason, private investors rely upon international capital 
markets for long-term finance to execute capital projects (Dailami and Leipziger 1998; Irving and 




Various authors have demonstrated the importance of international economic conditions (or ‘push 
factor’) in determining private finance (c.f. Calvo et al., 1993). Key push factors may include: 
international interest rates; world growth rates; (Taylor and Sarno, 1997); and global liquidity as 
measured by the money supplies of key advanced economies (Ahmed and Zlate, 2013). A decline 
in the US interest rate may be a driving factor of private finance in developing countries, 
particularly those who are integrated into the international credit market (Dailami and Leipziger, 
1998). For example, Kappeler and Nemoz (2010) in Yuan et al., (2012) provide evidence that the 
global financial crisis of 2008 had a disproportionately strong impact on the development of PPPs 
within developing countries. This was because private finance for PPP projects became more 
expensive and market capacity was substantially reduced, leading some commentators to claim 
that the PPP model was redundant. Based upon this synthesis of literature, the following 
hypotheses have been developed, namely that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of private sector participation in energy infrastructure project delivery 
is positively related to business freedom. 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of private sector participation in energy infrastructure delivery is 
positively dependent on the liquidity of the capital market.  
Hypothesis 4: The degree of private sector participation in energy infrastructure delivery is 
positively dependent on: (H4a): trade openness; but negatively related to (H4b): fiscal burden. 
Hypothesis 5: The degree of private sector participation in energy infrastructure delivery is 
negatively related to the global interest rate. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The deductive methodological approach adopted sought to prove hypotheses arising from extant 
literature using quantitative deterministic modeling techniques and secondary (independent 
variable) data sources. Secondary data were compiled from the World Bank Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF); and Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project 
Database; Index of Economic Freedom (IEF); World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and Financial Development Database; and the Bank of Ghana annual financial statements. Time 
series data on forms of PPP contracts and the degree of private sector participation were obtained 
from the World Bank PPIAF and PPI Project Database over the period 1994 to 2013. These 
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databases contain utility PPI project investment information (in millions of US$) for 
telecommunications, energy, water and sewage, and transport projects per country. Importantly, 
the database registers private sector commitments to invest in public infrastructure (rather than 
actual disbursements) and therefore, tracks private sector intentions to invest. Because the database 
compiles information on predominantly large PPI projects, smaller projects are often omitted and 
hence, the total PPI quoted may not be accurate. Despite this omission, the database is the most 
complete source of PPI data across developing countries. Political and regulatory factors were 
obtained from the IEF whilst domestic/external economic and market conditions variables were 
sourced from World Bank WDI and financial development database, and the Bank of Ghana 
annual financial statements.  
 
Dependent Variables Degree of Private Sector Participation 
The degree of private sector participation is determined by the form of PPP contract chosen by the 
private investor and connotes private investors’ risk appetite. The greater the investment 
commitment and ownership level, the higher the risk, which in itself determines a higher degree 
of intensity of participation. Therefore, a higher degree of participation in a particular form(s) of 
PPP contract is represented by a Boolean (binary) variable. Table 1 presents the project vehicle 
types, the intensity of private participation and associated Boolean coding.  
 
Independent Variables  
Independent variables are contained within two thematic groups, namely: i) infrastructure project 
characteristic variables; and ii) socio-political and economic variables. There are five 
infrastructure project characteristic variables, namely: i) degree of ownership and risks (OWN): 
measures the percentage of private investors’ resource commitment into each energy project, 
ranging from 0 to 100%; ii) size of investment (INVESTSIZE): measures the total amount of 
investment, in millions of U.S dollars, committed to the project; iii) project sector (SECT): a binary 
variable assigned a value of 1 if the project is a power sector project or 0 if the project is an oil and 
gas sector project; iv) project segment/network (SEGT): a binary variable assigned a value of 1 if 
the project is in generation segment or 0 if it is in transmission and distribution segment; and v) 
revenue source (REVSOURCE): a binary variable that assigned a value of 1 if the project has an 
identified revenue source or 0 if otherwise. With regards socio-political and economic variables, a 
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further five variables were apparent, namely: i) business freedom (BFREED) index: provides an 
overall indicator of the efficiency of government regulation of business. The score ranges from 0 
to 100, with 100 indicating the freest business environment; ii) fiscal freedom (FISCAL) index: 
provides a composite measure of the burden of taxes that reflects both marginal tax rates and the 
overall level of taxation, including direct and indirect taxes imposed by all levels of government, 
as a percentage of GDP. It is expressed on a scale of 0 to 100; iii) capital market development 
(CAPMKT): provides a measure of the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP and rate of 
turnover in the stock market; iv) trade openness (OPENESS): provides the sum of imports and 
exports as a fraction of GDP to represent a measure of the country’s receptiveness to foreign 
investment; and v) global interest rates (GLOBIR): usually approximated by the US Federal Funds 
rate, GLOBIR measures the opportunity cost of alternative investments. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES  
Inferential analysis was used to make generalizations about the wider population from the sample 
gathered and specifically to test hypotheses (Gabrenya, 2003; Baddie and Halley, 1995). Sample 
data collected sought to examine the relationship and differences between variables (Saunders et 
al., 2009). Significance testing was adopted to measure the probability that a pattern or relationship 
existing between the dependent and explanatory variables occurs by chance alone (Sirkin, 2005; 
Borror, 2009). Statistical significance was used to determine if a null hypothesis should be rejected 
or retained using probability values (or p-values) (Meier et al., 2011). Statistical significance is 
attained when a p-value is less than the significance level or alpha (a) level (Redmond and Colton, 
2001; Krzywinski and Altman, 2013; Sham and Purcell, 2014). Significance levels α = 0.05 (5%), 
α = 0.10 (10%) and α = 0.01 (1%) were used for the analysis.  
 
Estimation Model 
The Binary Logistic Regression Model (BLRM) was adopted as a probabilistic statistical 
classification model to measure the relationship between the categorical dependent variable and 
independent variables. This econometric model was chosen because it is capable of accurately 
modeling a Boolean dependent variable. The product of calculations undertaken sought to 
determine which explanatory variables empirically influence the degree of private sector 





Logistic regression uses a linear regression to model the probability 𝑝" using a linear predictor 
function (LPF) 𝑓 𝑥  for a particular data point i written as:  
 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝛽' + 𝛽)𝑥),"	 + 	𝛽,𝑥,,"	 + ⋯+	𝛽	.𝑥"	     (1)  
 
Where 𝛽', … . 𝛽1 are regression coefficients indicating the relative effect of a particular 
independent variable on the dependent variable. The logit model belongs to the class of binary 
response models that models a Boolean-valued outcome variable 𝑌" for probability	𝑝" into the 
form: 
 𝑝" = Pr 𝑌" = 1ǀ	X = 𝐹(𝛽' + 𝛽)𝑥),"	 + 	𝛽,𝑥,,"	 + ⋯+	𝛽	.𝑥"	)    (2) 
 
Where 𝑝" is the probability of success; i.e. the probability of the outcome of 1 for trial i;	𝐹(. ) is 
the logistic distribution function taking on values strictly between zero and one: 0 < G(z) < 1 for 
all real numbers z.  
 
After estimating the model, the probability that y=1 for each observation can be predicted. For the 
logit model, the probabilities are limited between 0 and 1. The predicted probability indicates the 
likelihood of y=1. If the predicted probability is greater than 0.5 we can predict that y=1, otherwise 
y=0. Equation 2 can be re-written as: 
 𝑝" = Pr 𝑌" = 1ǀ	X =) ;<=(>?@>A<A,B	@	>C<C,B	@⋯@	>	𝒌<B	))@;<=(>?@>A<A,B	@	>C𝒙C,B	@⋯@	𝜷	G𝒙B	)                   (3) 
 
Based on the model above, the predicted probability for the degree of private sector participation 




𝑝" = Pr 𝑌" = 1ǀ	X = 𝐹(𝛽' + 𝛽)𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽,𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +	𝛽P𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇 +	𝛽S𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑇 +	𝛽U𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽X𝐵𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷 +	𝛽[𝑂𝑃𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 +	𝛽]𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑅 +	𝛽_𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐿 +	𝛽)'𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀𝐾)																																																																																																																		(4)																											        
 
Parameter Estimation  
	
Coefficients  
The coefficients returned from a logistic regression model are log-odds ratios. They indicate the 
log-odds of a ‘success’ change with a one-unit change in the independent variable. Increasing the 
log-odds of a success means increasing the probability that the dependent variable, y = 1 (makes 
that outcome more/ less likely) and vice-versa - decreasing the log-odds of a success means 
decreasing the probability that y = 0. Therefore, the sign of the log-odds ratio shows the direction 
of its relationship: (+) means a positive relationship between xi and the likelihood of a success, and 
(-) means a negative relationship. The signs of the coefficient are interpreted but not the magnitude, 
as the latter cannot be interpreted using the coefficient because different models (linear probability, 
logit and probit) have different scales of coefficients. 
 
Odd Ratios (Relative Risk of the Logit Model) 
The odds ratios are the exponentiation of the coefficients and can be easier to interpret than the 
coefficient which is in log-odds units. The odd ratio is p/ (1-p) and measures the probability that y 
= 1 relative to the probability that y = 0. For instance, a ratio of 2 means that the outcome y = 1 is 
twice as likely as the outcome of y = 0. 
 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
To measure the adequacy of a fitted logistic regression model, goodness of fit measures were 
employed:  
 
Percent correctly predicted 
The overall percentage gives the percent of cases where the dependent variables were accurately 
classified as either occurring or not occurring on the basis of our two-variable model. There is no 
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The Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) Test is akin to a Chi Square test, and indicates the extent to which 
the model fits the data, as in log-linear modeling. If insignificant, then the model has adequate fit 
and visa-versa. If the H-L goodness-of-fit test statistic is > 0.05, the model estimates fit the data at 
an acceptable level. That is, well-fitting models show non-significance on the goodness-of-fit test. 
Akin to other significant tests, H-L determines whether the model fits or not but does not reveal 
the extent of the fit. 
 
(Pseudo) R Square   
(Pseudo) R Square is an approximation of the actual R squared (R2) in linear regression, with its 
continuous dependent variables. The (Pseudo) R Square is developed to mimic R2 for logistic 
regression models. There are a number of different Pseudo R Squares but for the purpose of this 
research the Nagelkerke’s (Pseudo) R2 is used. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF PRIOR HYPOTHESIS 
Parameter estimates such as logistic coefficients, odd ratios, goodness of fit measures and 
probability scores were used to examine the significance, direction, magnitude and the overall fit 
of the relationships in the pattern of data. In all, ten variables (originally obtained from the extant 
literature) were identified as factors that determine the degree of private sector participation. 
Scientific Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) software was used to analyze the data and 
accompanying literature used to either accept or reject the various hypotheses previously 
formulated. Analyses are summarized and tabulated in Table 2. Logistic regression was performed 
to ascertain the effects of the independent variables on the degree of private sector participation. 
Model 1.1 reports estimates on infrastructure project characteristics variables only while Model 
1.2 reports estimates on both  infrastructure project characteristics variables and the socio-political 




From the results, the goodness-of-fit measures in Model 1.1 display an overall percentage of cases 
correctly predicted at around 76% but this rose to 81% in Model 1.2. This means that 81% of the 
intensities of private sector participation have been accurately classified as either higher or lower, 
which is an improvement when the socio-political and economic variables were added to the 
infrastructure project characteristics variables. The H-L goodness-of-fit test statistic is 
insignificant and is greater than 0.05, indicating that the model's estimates fit the data at an 
acceptable level. The Nagelkerke R-Squared reveals that about 14% (Model 1.1) and 38% (Model 
1.2) of the proportion of the variation in the degree of private sector participation in both models 
can be explained by the independent variables. The predicted probability of Model 1.1 indicates 
that the infrastructure project characteristics variables alone can predict 0.79 of the model. 
However, when the socio-political and economic variables were added, the probability moved to 
1 which illustrates that all the independent variables are key in predicting the likelihood of the 
private sector participating in higher forms of PPP. The high predicted probabilities reported upon 
in both models indicate that private investors pefer to invest in greenfield, concession and 
divestiture vehicles as opposed to management and leasing contracts. This may be because whilst 
such contractual arrangements are high risk, they also offer greater control over the work and a 
greater opportunity to generate higher profit margins.  
 
From the main results, all the infrastructure project characteristics variables in Model 1.1 did not 
display significant coefficient estimates, except SEGT with a coefficient of 1.036 (p = 0.047). This 
indicates that the generation segment is more likely to influence the degree of private sector 
participation. By magnitude, SEGT is 2.817 times more likely to increase the degree of 
participation for every 1 percentage point increase in private investment in the project. However, 
when the socio-political and economic variables were added (see Model 1.2), project sector 
(SECT), which was insignificant in Model 1.1, becomes significant with a coefficient of 1.324 (p 
= 0.082). The SECT variable is 3.757 times more likely to influence private investment, which 
means that it is a critical consideration in the decision to participate in energy infrastructure 
delivery. The magnitude of influence of the SEGT in private investment is also increased to 3.586 
times more likely. This confirms Hypotheses 1c and 1d that the degree of private sector 




Out of the five socio-political and economic variables added, three of them: i) business freedom 
(BFREED) index, ii) trade openness (OPENESS), and iii) global interest rates (GLOBIR) variables 
were significant at (p = 0.005; 0.011 and 0.077) respectively. The business freedom (BFREED) 
index, with a negative coefficient (-0.280), shows an inverse relationship between the regulatory 
business enviroment and the extent of private participation, although a positive relationship was 
anticipated, therefore rejecting Hypothesis 2. An increase in BFREED index will reduce the extent 
of private participation by about 24% (odd ratio of 0.756) (refer to Table 2). The OPENESS 
variable on the other hand displayed a positive coefficient, indicating that a rise in trade openess 
index for Ghana is more likely to increase the receptiveness of foreign investment into the energy 
sector, satisfying Hypothesis 4a that the degree of participation is positively dependent on trade 
openess. GLOBIR also displayed a positive coefficient signifying that a higher movement in the 
US federal funds rate is less likely to induce the degree of participation by 1.362 times in every 1 
percentage point increase in the degree of private participation. However, this result is also not 
consistent with literature (Dailami and Leipziger, 1998; Calvo et al., 1993) that suggest that a 
decline in the US federal funds rates is a driving factor of private finance in developing economies, 
and vice versa. Hence, Hypothesis 5 was rejected. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Meeting the global demand for electricity consumption requires sustainable investments into 
building new, and maintaining (or upgrading/ replacing) existing, power sector infrastructure. 
Dealing with the deficit in energy infrastructure is a prerequisite to tackling the fundamental 
challenges to the economic growth of developing countries. However, mobilization of affordable 
finance and investment represents a significant challenge. Public funds and donor support have 
historically been inadequate, especially in jurisdictions where infrastructure provision is the 
primary responsibility of the prevailing government. For this reason, most economies have 
resorted to the private sector for delivering energy infrastructure projects, through PPP contracts. 
The infrastructure project’s characteristics and the social-economic-political health of the host 
country have been determinants of private investment into the energy sector.  
 
From extant literature, the paper identified five infrastructure project characteristics and five socio-
political and economic investment environment factors as determinants of the degree of investor 
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participation. The study found out that there is a high probability that private investors pefer to 
invest in higher risk and potentially more profitable greenfield, concession and privatization 
vehicles vis-a-vis management and leasing contracts. None of the infrastructure project 
characteristics variables in Model 1.1 displayed significant coefficient estimates, except Project 
Segment/Network (SEGT), indicating that controlling for both transmission and distribution 
segments, the generation segment is more likely to influence the degree of private sector 
participation. Adding the socio-political and economic variables, however, changed the 
significance levels of the explanatory variables, with energy sector together with business freedom 
(BFREED) index, trade openness (OPENESS) and global interest rates (GLOBIR) variables 
becoming statistically significant. 
 
New knowledge emanating from this paper provides crucial information on investment drivers to 
PPP advisors and project managers. Future research is however required to explore competitive 
routes to infrastructure debt and equity finance options that finance energy projects as well as 
measure the impact of any changes in government policy. In addition, the research needs to be 
extended to cover other developing nations in order to expand the application and impact of the 
findings. Whist the work is not a panacea to the energy infrastructure conundrum that developing 
nations are confronted with, it will engender future discussion amongst government policy makers 
responsible for promoting and managing PPP projects.  
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Figure 1 – Risk compared to participation for PPP contracts: a theoretical construct  







































Table 1 - Degree of Private Sector Participation 
 
Project Vehicle Types Intensity of Private 
Participation 
Boolean Coding 
Concession/Greenfield/Privatization  Very High  1 





Table 2 – Summary of Analysis   
Independent variables Model 1.1 Model 1.2 




















BFREED  -0.280 (0.100) *** 
0.756 
OPNESS  4.405 (1.736) ** 
81.836 
GLOBIR  0.0309 (0.175) *** 
1.362 
FISCAL  0.026 (0.052) 
1.026 
CAPMKT  0.113 (0.127) 
1.120 




N 10 10 
Percent correctly predicted 76% 81% 
Hosmer and Lemesnow Chi Square test 6.638 3.978 
(Nagelkerke) R-Squared 0.141 0. 381 
Pr(Y=1) 0.79 1 
 
Legend: * statistically significant at 90% (p<0.1) level, ** at 95% (p<0.05) level *** at 99% (p<0.001) level; 
standard errors in parentheses, and odd ratios below the standard errors. 
 
 
